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Discussant's Response to "A Behavioral-Economics 
Approach to Auditors' Risk Assessments" 
Peter R. Gillett 
University of Kansas (former Partner, Grant Thornton, UK) 
Introduction 
Let me begin by thanking Raj Srivastava for inviting me to act as practitioner 
discussant for Professor Waller's paper. Many of you know already that I am in the 
course of making a transition from practitioner to academic. Let me express the hope, 
then, that Raj's asking me to act as practitioner discussant is a reflection of his appre-
ciation of my previous work, and not a comment on his perceptions of my progress in 
this transition. 
I propose to discuss this paper by regarding it as an onion. By this I do not mean, 
of course, that it has a strong smell, that it leaves a bad taste in the mouth, or that it 
will make our eyes water. Rather, I mean that I intend to examine it in a number of 
layers, beginning with the outside. 
The abstract tells us that real agents are rationally bounded, and that the audit risk 
model and auditors' risk assessments are inconsistent with a Bayesian rational choice 
model. I do not find the practitioner within me resisting these views at this level: I find 
this an acceptable onion. 
However, as we peel off this outer skin in order to examine the onion within, we 
might note that it is a somewhat thin skin. I have not generally found that auditors as 
individuals are more rational than others, although they may be more analytical, and 
perhaps more professionally skeptical. Professional standards nowhere assert that the 
audit risk model is, or should be, consistent with a Bayesian rational choice model. 
The many potential causes of suicide, despair and divorce among audit partners do 
not, in my experience, include a deep-rooted concern that our risk assessments might 
fail to obey the normative canons of Bayesian thought. So it is fair (and may be 
reasonable) to ask whether these are important and interesting findings. Let us 
proceed to do so. 
Economizing with the truth? 
At the second layer of examination we find that Professor Waller is not content 
simply to identify the non-Bayesian nature of auditor decision-making regarding risk 
assessments, but is concerned to offer an alternative model: the behavioral-economic 
model. This model differs from strict rational choice models insofar as it recognizes 
that: 
• Agent errors are possible. 
• Choice processes can be improved. 
• Convergence with a strict rational choice model may not be worth the agent's 
incremental costs. 
• Divergence from a strict rational choice model need not be presumed to be 
error. 
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I like this inner onion too: indeed, I shall be happy to admit the possibility of 
auditor error, especially if Professor Waller can help us reduce our errors in the future. 
In this sense, I share with great enthusiasm his search for a model that is both descrip-
tive and prescriptive. In common with a number of other practitioners, however, I 
should be happy to forgo a great deal of descriptive power in return for a prescription 
for improvement. This is a particularly salient issue, of course, in the development by 
auditors of decision aids: the objective is not to build models that emulate current 
decision making skills, but to provide tools to improve them. 
Who among audit practitioners would argue with the view that neither audit deci-
sion making, nor the acquisition of information on which decisions might be based, 
are costless? Not I, certainly. What practitioners might hope is that effective decision 
aids can play a role in reducing the incremental costs of improved decision making 
(whether or not that turns out to be a closer approximation to the rational choice 
model). 
As we remove this second layer, and proceed to consider some of the more detailed 
aspects of this paper, we might note that it, too, wears a little thin in places. For 
example, why should anyone suppose that any kind of rational choice model is appro-
priate for the audit context that Professor Waller has chosen to study? Scriptures do 
not require human activities to be rational: as Professor Waller makes clear, profes-
sional standards do not explicitly (and apparently not even implicitly) require 
rationality. Moreover, rational choice models are models of choice, and the account 
given in this paper is based upon revision of beliefs. The auditor's task, on the other 
hand, is to render an opinion, and there are questions of an epistemological and meta-
physical nature that can be asked regarding the expression of an opinion: 
• Can opinion formation properly be equated with the formulation (and possible 
revision) of a belief? 
• Is opinion formation an act of choice? 
• Ought opinion formation be rational? 
I take an opinion, in the context of an audit, to be a professionally considered view, 
a professional judgment. If we find that certain models of belief revision do not corre-
spond to processes used in reaching audit opinions, is this evidence that the opinion 
formation process is in some sense deficient? Or is it, rather, evidence that opinions 
are not exactly like beliefs, and that the canons for the formation of professional opin-
ions are not necessarily those normatively prescribed by Bayesians? Auditors, clients, 
legislators and social scientists all recognize that audit information and audit decision 
making are not costless. Since society is not willing to wait an infinite time for an 
audit opinion, nor clients willing to pay infinite amounts, there is no reason to expect 
that audit decision making will be fully rational, in the sense of using all available 
information, in an optimal manner. Which of us can be surprised, then, at the idea that 
auditors might trade off the incremental value of additional information or analysis 
with their additional costs? Which of us thinks that auditors have infinite computa-
tional and processing abilities? Professional standards explicitly recognize the limited 
nature of the auditing process. 
Although I do not propose to develop the point in detail today, we should also note 
that many auditor assessments (e.g., the assessment of internal control risk as 
maximum) explicitly do not represent auditor beliefs. They represent economic deci-
sions not to incur the (audit) costs of developing a belief. See, for example, Waller 
(1993). 
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Auditors' Risk Assessments: Inconsistencies with Rational Choice 
M y argument is that auditors, clients, legislators and social scientists do not expect 
auditing to follow a strict rational choice model. When we examine the third level of 
our onion, to study the claimed inconsistencies between auditors' risk assessments and 
the rational choice model, we may do so with interest to see what inconsistencies are 
found. That there are such inconsistencies, of course, is not in the least remarkable. 
"The audit risk model...decomposes risk in a muddled way that is inconsistent 
with the Bayesian postulates of coherence and total evidence," Professor Waller 
writes. What shall we say to this? If you prick us do we not bleed? Three questions 
spring at once to my mind: 
• Is it muddled because it is inconsistent (with the Bayesian model), or is it 
muddled anyway and inconsistent? 
• What does "muddled" actually mean in this context? Confused? Or merely not 
unboundedly rational? 
• Can we not equally express this finding as: "The Bayesian rational choice 
model fails adequately to represent the decomposition of audit risk which 
professional standards urge upon auditors?" 
This is not the place, and these are not the times, for a rational defense of the audit 
risk model. It has been subject to much criticism for over a decade (see, for example, 
Kinney 1983; Cushing & Loebbecke 1983; Jiambalvo & Waller 1984; Kinney 1989), 
and yet is still used by practitioners as a guide for planning decisions regarding alter-
nate sources of audit reliance. 
Professional standards themselves do not prescribe the functional form of the 
model. For example, "The model is not intended to be a mathematical formula 
including all factors that may influence the determination of individual risk compo-
nents (AICPA 1981)." Similarly, "The way the auditor considers these component 
risks and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his audit 
approach (AICPA 1983)." Nevertheless, the simple multiplicative approach described 
by Professor Waller has been widely used to operationalize the model, and appears 
prima facie to be vulnerable to the criticisms found in this paper. 
Decomposition 
Let us consider the criticism relating to decomposition. AICPA (1983) defines 
Inherent Risk in terms of the susceptibility to material misstatement, assuming there 
are no related controls. Control risk is defined in terms of whether material misstate-
ments would be prevented or detected by controls. Professor Waller's comments 
regarding the difference in timing of preventive and detective controls (vis-a-vis 
occurrence of a material misstatement) are well made and to the point. They are not, 
however, new (see, e.g., Leslie 1985). The professional waters were further muddied 
(or should we say, "muddled") by the issuance of SAS 55 (AICPA 1989), which intro-
duced the additional concept of the control environment. 
Taking at face value the invitation in SAS 47 cited earlier: "The way the auditor 
considers these component risks and combines them involves professional judgment 
and depends on his audit approach (AICPA 1983)", a number of firms have elected to 
combine their assessments of Inherent Risk (as defined), the implications of the 
control environment, and preventive controls, so that what they actually assess (in a 
process sometimes called Environmental Assessment) is the overall susceptibility to 
material misstatement (see, for example, Grant Thornton 1990). Continuing with 
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Professor Waller's notation, let us call this IR*. In like manner, the Control Risk 
assessment (often based on attribute sampling to test the effectiveness of detective 
controls) may be referred to as CR*. 
Now, while IR and CR do capture the concepts defined in professional standards, 
IR* and CR* capture the assessments operationalized by auditors; this recombination 
is intended to be legitimated by the flexibility incorporated in the standards. Of 
course, this is essentially what Professor Waller offers as an alternative simplification 
to reduce analysis costs. Contrary to his position in the present paper, however: 
• This is a current operationalization rather than an alternative. 
• IR* may be taken as a primitive, rather than as a simplification - indeed, a strict 
interpretation of the coherence postulate as set out in this paper requires suscep-
tibility to be assessed in the light of everything the auditor actually knows, and 
does not provide for counterfactual hypothetical assessments; however, if such 
hypotheticals were permitted, they could be constructed consistently with the 
three postulates. 
• This approach does not, therefore, readily demonstrate the value of a behav-
ioral-economics approach. 
Belief Revision 
Let us peel another layer off our onion. There still remains the question of how IR* 
and CR* might be assessed and combined, and here we can see behavioral-economics 
compromises at work in the use of a multiplicative model. The incremental cost of the 
Bayesian approach is relatively minor, and it is frustrating that, on the whole, auditors 
have not taken the next step to a discrete Bayesian model (see, for example, Leslie 
1985). A little algebra and a few minutes work with a spreadsheet show that we can 
easily adapt Professor Waller's example to a Bayesian revision model. What is the 
auditor interested in? Presumably, using Professor Waller's notation it is PK'((M) = 
PK(M\-D). In other words, audit risk is the risk that there is a material misstatement, 
given that we did not find one. (In common with Leslie and others, I presume that the 
auditor knows what to do if a material misstatement is discovered!) 
PK(M\-D) = PK(M & -D) / PK(-D) = PK(-D\M) x PK(M) / PK(-D) 
where PK(-D\M) = PK(-D\M & -C) x PK(-C\M) 
and PK(-D) = PK(-D\M) x PK(M) + PK(-D\-M) x PK(-M) = 
PK(-D\M) x PK(M) + (1 - PK(M)) 
Letting PK(M) = IR*, PK(-C\M) = CR*, and 
PK(-D\M &-C) = Detection Risk DR 
gives PK(M\-D) = (IR* x CR* x DR) / (1 - IR* + IR* x CR* x DR). 
Naturally, this gives different results from the usual multiplicative formula. 
However, assuming that given the changed semantics auditors would assign different 
values to the risks, it is easy to show that identical results for the required detection 
risk DR can be achieved by taking 
PK(M) = IR* / (IR* + 1 - PK(M\-D)). 
Figure 1 shows what values would need to be assigned to IR* in the case of 
Professor Waller's example (page 118), in order for the Bayesian model to require the 
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same detection risk for an audit risk of 5% as the multiplicative model in the example 
did. 
Figure 1 
Figure la: Multiplicative Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk 
Low Moderate High 
Inherent Risk 0.18 0.44 1.00 
Low 0.36 0.77 0.32 0.14 
Moderate 0.67 0.41 0.17 0.07 
High 1.00 0.28 0.11 0.05 
Figure lb: Bayesian Revision Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk  
Low Moderate High 
Inherent Risk 0.18 0.44 1.00 
Low 0.27 0.77 0.32 0.14 
Moderate 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.07 
High 0.51 0.28 0.11 0.05 
The data in the example, of course, is somewhat speculative, and Figure 2 shows a 
similar comparison for the published "definitions" of another firm (Grant Thornton 
1990). 
Figure 2 
Figure 2a: Multiplicative Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk  
Limited Moderate Significant Maximum 
Inherent Risk 0.13 0.24 0.56 1.00 
Low 0.50 0.75 0.42 0.18 0.10 
Moderate 0.71 0.53 0.30 0.13 0.07 
High 1.00 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.05 
Figure 2b: Bayesian Revision Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk 
Limited Moderate Significant Maximum 
Inherent Risk 0.13 0.24 0.56 1.00 
Low 0.34 0.75 0.42 0.18 0.10 
Moderate 0.43 0.53 0.30 0.13 0.07 
High 0.51 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.05 
I am not claiming that either firm would, in fact, select these values in a Bayesian 
model. We can note, however, that the results for the two firms are comparable, and 
we can ask. what meaning could be given to such values in the Bayesian interpretation. 
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It is interesting to note that even in this Bayesian model, behavioral-economics is still 
at work: 
• As Leslie (1985) notes, this approach uses discrete approximations to contin-
uous distributions. 
• The analysis assumes that misstatements detected and corrected by controls are 
known to the auditor (as part of K); i f it is assumed that controls detect and 
correct without auditor knowledge, the resulting formulae are more complex; if 
detected and corrected misstatements may or may not be known to the auditor, 
even more sophistication will be necessary. 
Professor Waller further argues that extra-conditional information introduces addi-
tional inconsistencies with the rational choice model, and I see no reason to disagree. 
Second-Order Uncertainty 
We are now ready to peel away the last layer of our onion, and study the little piece 
in the middle. The coherence postulate of the rational choice model requires that 
beliefs be representable as unique subjective probabilities. You may think, as many do, 
that this is a limitation in the model itself, but that is a story for another day. Ignorance 
is a feature of the auditor's environment, and other formulations seek to address this 
directly (see, for example, Shafer & Srivastava 1990). 
It is true that professional standards implicitly recognize second-order uncertainty. 
In practice, it may be the case that second-order uncertainty is a consequence of 
behavioral-economics, rather than an argument for this approach. In my experience, 
few auditors actually believe that client environments can be partitioned into just three 
isomorphism classes, or that the values for inherent risk used in their firms' 
approaches are representative of long-run frequencies. Behavioral-economics has 
caused auditors to develop methods that incorporate second-order uncertainties. It 
may well be, of course, that such uncertainties would have existed without current 
approaches to risk assessment - but Professor Waller does not show evidence for this, 
and nor shall I. The question remains, however: i f my beliefs about client circum-
stances cannot be represented by unique subjective probabilities, does that fact exhibit 
shortcomings in me, in my beliefs, or in the applicability of the rational choice model 
that requires this representation? 
Conclusions 
Now that we have reduced this paper to a pile of onion rings, it may be time to take 
stock of what we have achieved via this tangential approach, before we break out the 
condiments of congratulations. Let me begin by noting that the paper presumes 
throughout that risk assessments are individual choices - and this is by no means the 
whole story. Professor Waller argues that auditors are (at best) boundedly rational. I 
believed this before I read this paper, and I believe it still. 
He argues that professional standards and practices are inconsistent with Bayesian 
postulates for a rational choice model. It is not clear that professional standards are 
inconsistent with such postulates, although they neither mandate nor even encourage a 
Bayesian approach. However, I find my profession guilty as charged regarding 
common practices. 
He argues that a behavioral-economics approach will help us to better describe and 
prescribe auditor performance and divergence from a rational choice model. As to 
description, I accept his point. As to prescription, I believe that in many places the 
profession is already making use of such an approach - although there are no doubt 
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further opportunities to be seized. Perhaps it would be equally valid to say that such 
an approach wil l assist researchers to better describe and prescribe the work of 
auditors. 
It would be presumptuous indeed to suggest that the work of researchers is inher-
ently more noble or important than that of auditors, and this is not my intention. I see 
the laying down of normative approaches without regard for practical feasibilities as 
somewhat sterile, and the documentary description of auditor shortcomings as a sorry 
and sordid affair. Researchers have the opportunity, through carefully considered 
prescription, to add value to the auditing profession and to society. In this sense, at 
least, Professor Waller clearly knows his onions! I congratulate him on an interesting 
and thought-provoking paper. 
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